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Econometric Assessment of IPO Underpricing and Information Asymmetry in Emerging Equity Markets: Evidence from State-Owned Enterprise Privatization (EPRA International Journal of Economics Business and Management Studies)

Research paperEPRA International Journal of Economics Business and Management StudiesSeptember 20268 pages12 min readBabakhanova NozimaOriginal source
Key number
13.25%
Average underpricing in dynamic book-building IPOs p.4
Key number
28.30%
Average underpricing in static fixed-price IPOs p.4
Key number
43%
Inflection threshold of residual state ownership p.6

Summary

  • The empirical study examines initial public offering (IPO) underpricing in state-owned enterprise (SOE) privatizations across Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia from 2012 to 2025.p.3
  • Capital-intensive sectors like telecommunications and infrastructure exhibit average initial discounts of 12.30 to 14.75 percent, while competitive sectors routinely surpass 26.00 percent.p.4
  • Offerings conducted through dynamic book-building procedures average 13.25 percent underpricing, compared to 28.30 percent for static fixed-price offerings.p.4
  • Transactions led by top-tier underwriting syndicates register an initial discount of 12.80 percent versus 25.71 percent for lower-tier domestic solo intermediaries.p.4
  • Econometric estimations identify a non-linear, U-shaped relationship between residual state equity retention and underpricing, with an inflection threshold at approximately 43 percent.p.6

Key insights

  1. High underwriter prestige significantly reduces initial IPO underpricing by an estimated 9.4 percentage points.p.5
  2. Dynamic book-building allocation lowers initial underpricing by 7.1 percentage points relative to fixed-price offerings.p.5
  3. Multi-intermediary syndication exerts an independent dampening effect on initial primary underpricing spreads.p.5
  4. Larger enterprise asset scale and longer operating age significantly compress the underpricing spread by mitigating information opacity.p.5
  5. Moderate retained state equity up to approximately 43 percent reassures investors against regulatory expropriation and lowers primary discounts.p.6
  6. Retained state equity exceeding 43 percent triggers agency concerns regarding bureaucratic interference, compelling divesting authorities to widen underpricing discounts.p.6
  7. Sectoral tangibility and monopolistic market shares reduce fundamental valuation uncertainty and dampen initial underpricing.p.4
  8. Financial leverage and pre-offering 30-day market volatility amplify valuation concessions demanded by primary market participants.p.5

Topics and entities

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