The Influence of Corporate Governance Mechanisms and ESG Reporting on Underpricing Moderated by Underwriter Reputation (Pendas Jurnal Ilmiah Pendidikan Dasar)
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- The research analyses a sample of 275 non-bank companies with positive initial returns after conducting initial public offerings on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 2019–2024.p.1
- The average level of underpricing across the 275 sample companies stood at 31,5589%, while the average ESG disclosure score was 0,0844 (around 8,44%).p.5
- ESG reporting demonstrated a statistically significant negative association with underpricing in Model 2 with a coefficient of −15,8998 (p = 0,016).p.6
- The interaction between ESG reporting and underwriter reputation was negative and significant in Model 3 with a coefficient of −37,7402 (p = 0,002).p.6
- Internal corporate governance mechanisms, including female directorship (p = 0,946), independent commissioners (p = 0,128), managerial ownership (p = 0,871), and institutional ownership (p = 0,385), showed no statistically significant direct effect on underpricing.p.6
Key insights
- ESG disclosure provides a signaling mechanism that reduces information asymmetry and is linked to lower IPO underpricing.p.7
- Underwriter reputation acts as a significant certifying moderator that strengthens the negative relationship between ESG reporting and IPO underpricing.p.6
- Underwriter reputation does not significantly moderate the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and IPO underpricing.p.6
- The average ESG disclosure score of 8,44% indicates that non-financial ESG transparency remains relatively low among newly listed Indonesian firms.p.7
- Internal governance structures such as board gender diversity and commissioner independence do not directly translate into IPO pricing discounts.p.7
- A vast majority (93,30%) of underpricing variation in Model 3 remains explained by unmodeled factors such as firm size, age, market demand, and investor behavior.p.5
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